Connected Vehicle Cybersecurity Volvo Group Trucks Technology

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DOWNLOADING

Chalmers, DAT300, 2019-10-21

WannaCry Ransomware Attack 2017-05-12



230 000 computers in 150 countries affected

- British Hospitals severely impacted
- Maersk reported financial impact 250M\$



Imaginary - not a real case!

Your car ?

- impacting your ability to travel



http://virusguides.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ransomware-attacks-cars.jpg https://www.intelligentenvironments.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Ransomware-Car.png

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Imaginary – not a real case!

Trucks ?

- Impacting transportation of goods!

In the first 24 hours...

- Hospitals will run out of necessary supplies.
- Service stations will begin to run out of fuel.
- Just-in-time manufacturing get component shortages.

In just 2-3 days...

- Food shortages, consumer hoarding and panic.
- Garbage will start piling up in urban areas.
- Container ships will sit idle in ports and rail transport will be disrupted

In just one week...

• Automobile travel will cease due to lack of fuel.

(US-centric scenario)



https://www.tdsource.com/2016/08/03/if-trucking-stops



Volvo Group - What we do

We are one of the world's leading manufacturers of trucks, buses, construction equipment and marine and industrial engines.

ON THE ROAD

Our products help ensure that people have food on the table, can travel to their destination and roads to drive on.

IN THE CITY

Our products are part of the daily life. They take people to work, distribute goods and collect rubbish. We are developing tomorrow's public transport solutions.

AT SEA

IT PROVIDE

Our products and services are with you, regardless of whether you are at work on a ship or on holiday in your pleasure boat.


AT THE SITE

We contribute to the extraction of some of the world's most important raw materials. Our engines, machines and vehicles can be found at mining and construction sites and in the middle of forests.

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Group Trucks Technology

Our organization for **research and product development** of complete vehicles, powertrain, components and service offering.






BE THE MOST DESIRED AND SUCCESSFUL TRANSPORT SOLUTION PROVIDER IN THE WORLD


The World Evolve

- Drivers for new technology





The classic vehicle ... was a self-contained system





The modern vehicle ... is essentially a full IT infrastructure, on wheels!



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The future vehicle ... is autonomous, electric and computationally powerful




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Connected vehicles

- The more things are connected, the higher the security concern





Researchers demonstrate the potential

July 21, 2015: "Hackers remotely kill a Jeep on the highway" Source: <u>http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/</u> Details: <u>http://illmatics.com/Remote%20Car%20Hacking.pdf</u>


Feb 24, 2016: "Nissan Leaf easily hacked through browser-based attacks"

Source: <u>http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35642749/</u> Details:<u>http://www.troyhunt.com/2016/02/controlling-vehicle-features-of-nissan.html</u>

Sep 20, 2016: "Researchers remotely hack Tesla Model S" Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/20/researchers-remotelyhack-tesla-model-s/

Aug 2, 2016: "Hackers hijack big rig truck's accelerator and brakes"

Source: https://www.wired.com/2016/08/researchers-hack-big-rig-truck-hijack-accelerator-brakes/











Attackers and Motivations

Researcher may want to showcase and increase awareness

Hacker wants Fun, Fame

Third party developers want to offer add-ons and tuning

Criminal wants to disable vehicle to steal goods

Competitor can be interested in intellectual property Authorities may require functionality for law enforcement, owner want to circumvent

> **Driver** want higher road speed limit, **owner** want to control fuel consumption

Fleet/Vehicle owners may want to "upgrade" their own vehicles

Thief wants to disable alarm or immobilizer, copy/add keys

Criminals can earn money by vehicle ransom



Attackers and Attack vectors

Tool access (unauthorized program licence, ECU reprogramming)



Proximity access (Wifi/Bluetooth) Physical access (Using OBD connector, tampering with ECU's and/or CAN buses)

500 (

GLOBELROT



Remote access

- Telecom network access (radio / base station)
- VPN entry points (Back-office)
- Portals exposed to the Internet



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Attacks on infrastructure

ElectriCity – Bus 55

- Wireless connection
- Charging stations, 600+ Volts
 - Safety implications
- Supplier / consumer
 - Threat of fraud (billing)
- Something to think about:
 - Impact on society of a cyber attack on the power grid from transportation point of view: Electrical vs fossil fuel vehicles?





Attacks on infrastructure

V2I – Example use cases and threats

- Road works warning
 - False warnings
 - Jamming legitimate information
- Green light priority (heavy vehicles wear down pavement more when stopped. Energy consuming to decelerate and accelerate)
 - Cheating. Attackers getting green light.
 - Traffic disruption by spoofing heavy traffic (or emergency service vehicles)







Security Engineering principle


The principle for Security Engineering is a risk based approach.

Security requirements are derived using a

structured engineering process and based on:

- identification of threats
- risk assessment (likelihood and impact)
- <u>mitigate or accept the risk</u> associated with the threat


Note: Mature areas can have standardized, minimum security requirements (compliance)



Source: Myagmar, Yurcik

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
Medium

High

Risk Management - A very quick introduction

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
Security risks are dynamic - risk level at product release will not remain




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
Cybersecurity and Vehicle Lifecycle



Design for Security



Design for Security





- Threat Analysis to *identify* possible cybersecurity <u>threats</u>.
- Assess impact level of the identified threats/attacks (less focus on threat level)
- Formulate high level security requirements to mitigate the identified risks.
- Develop security concepts to be implemented.
- <u>Assess Threat Level</u> considering the security concepts in place
- Results in residual design risks (Accept or Avoid)



Threat Analysis & Risk assessment

- System model
- STRIDE analysis






	Α	В	С	D
1		HEAVENS Risk assessment tool		
2				
3	Id	Asset / Element	Threat	Attack example
4	1	Process X	Spoofing	
5	2	Process X	Tampering	
6	3	Process X	Repudiation	
7	4	Process X	InformationDisclosure	
8	5	Process X	DenialOfService	
9	6	Process X	ElevationOfPrivilege	
10	7	Data Flow Y	Tampering	
11	8	Data Flow Y	InformationDisclosure	
12	9	Data Flow Y	DenialOfService	
13	10			
14	11			
15	12			

Threat level

(Expertise, Equipment, Knowledge about TOE, Window of opportunity...)

Impact level

(Safety, Operational, Privacy/Legislation, Financial)



Security Level (SL)			Impact	Level (IL)		
		0	1	2	3	4
	0	QM	QM	QM	QM	Low
Threat Level	1	QM	Low	Low	Low	Medium
(TL)	2 QM Low Medium Mediu	Medium	High			
	3	QM	Low	Medium	High	High
	4	Low	Medium	High	High	Critical

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Security Requirements

• After determining the risk for identified threats, security requirements can be derived for each threat

No.	Asset	Threat	Security Attribute	Security Level
1	Vehicle Data Response	Tampering of Vehicle Data Response	Integrity	Low


High level security requirement #1:
The integrity of the Vehicle Data Response shall be ensured



Example of a Security Concept

Security Requirement: The integrity of message X shall be ensured


Integrity protection is e.g. included in AUTOSAR Secure Onboard Communication protocol (adding message authentication codes (MAC) to the original data)



Mechanism clear, but security relies on good key management




Implement Security




Software composition analysis

Code Travels



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Software and Hardware design - Example of isolated execution environment




Example use


- Need to protect access to private key
- Application can sign data, but have no access to key
- Even if attacker compromise application, private key is not compromised



Assess Security



Assess Security





Functional testing

- verify correct implementation of security measures

Receiver Secret

key K \downarrow

CNT

VOIN

PDU

MAC verificat


Last rcv.


counter

Monotonic


sync

PDU





Vulnerability and Fuzz testing - search for known and unknown vulnerabilities



- Scan for open ports, services exposed.
- Verify known vulnerabilities patched
- Software Composition analysis



Unknown vulnerabilites


- Fuzzing, expose interfaces to unexpected input
- Generation-based, protocol aware
- Robustness



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


Final Cybersecurity Review - is the system secure enough for release?




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Maintain Security



Remember?

- Threat and vulnerabilities change over time



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Vulnerability Management

Mainly related to mitigating from **known software vulnerabilities**.

The process is **proactive**, defend against known vulnerabilities **before attacks** take place.

Common types:

- Buffer overflow, over-reads
- Lack of input validation
- Code injection

0	p 50 Products By To	tal Number Of "I	Distinct" Vu	Inerabilities in 2017
	to year: <u>1999 2000 2001 20</u> ders	22 2003 2004 2005 20	06 2007 2008	2009 2010 2011 2012 201
	Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
1	Linux Kernel	Linux	OS	209
2	Android	Google	OS	159
3	Imagemagick	Imagemagick	Application	108
4	Iphone Os	Apple	OS	107
5	Mac Os X	Apple	OS	<u>79</u>
6	Windows Server 2008	Microsoft	OS	62
7	Windows 7	Microsoft	OS	59
8	Windows Vista	Microsoft	OS	58
9	Debian Linux	Debian	OS	57
0	Chrome	Google	Application	57



Scope

- Asset inventory
- Schedule

Assess

- Vulnerabilities feeds
- Scan / research assets
- Determine relevance

Prioritize

- Assess risk
- Plan actions

Remediate

- Deploy security updates
- Report progress

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The bigger picture - Holistic Cybersecurity Management



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Opportunities for students



Summer job Thesis work Internship

https://www.volvogroup.com/en-en/careers/opportunities-for-students.html

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Questions

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REMOTE PROGRAMMING DOWNLOADING

67%